CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-

WARRANTLESS SEIZURE

OF TELEPHONE BILLING RECORDS VIOLATES NEW JERSEY CONSTITU-

TION-State v.

Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982).

During an investigation into illegal gambling, the New Jersey
State Police uncovered Merrell Hunt's and Ralph Pirillo's names,'
along with two telephone numbers allegedly used by Hunt to conduct
a gambling business. 2 A state police detective requested and received
4
toll billing records 3 for these numbers from the telephone company.
The tolling records revealed that numerous calls had been made to
Sports Phone, an organization which furnishes current sporting events
results. 5
Evidence later obtained from court authorized pen registers, 6
wiretaps, 7 and searches8 led to Hunt's and Pirillo's indictments on

IState v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 341, 450 A.2d 952, 953 (1982). Hunt and known gambler
Robert Notaro were overheard discussing betting during an authorized wiretap of Notaro's
phone. Id. Hunt and Pirillo were also observed meeting with Notaro in Atlantic City. Id.
Informants later told police that Hunt and Pirillo were bookmakers. Id.
Ild. An informant had given police the phone numbers, although one number had been
uncovered during a prior investigation. Id.
I Telephone toll billing records contain itemized listings of long distance phone calls
charged to a customer's phone. Reporters Comm. v. AT&T Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1036 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979). The records list the numbers dialed, along with the
time, date and length of the calls. Id. at 1036. Telephone subscribers receive copies of their
tolling records monthly. Id.
4 State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 341, 450 A.2d 952, 953 (1982). AT&T policy, supposedly
adopted throughout the Bell System in 1974, prohibits disclosure of a customer's billing records
"in the absence of a subpoena or summons ... issued under the authority of a statute, court, or
legislative body." Reporters Comm. v. AT&T Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979). This policy does not appear to be consistently followed by the
individual telephone companies. Compare Hunt, 91 N.J. at 341, 450 A.2d 953 (New Jersey Bell
releases records on informal request) with Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. State, Ind. , 409 N.E.2d
1089, 1090 (1980) (Indiana Bell contests a court order to produce a customer's billing records).
State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 341, 450 A.2d 952, 953 (1982).
Id. at 342, 450 A.2d at 953. A pen register is "a device that records the numbers dialed on
a telephone." Id.; see also United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)
(discussing how a pen register operates). Police obtained a court order to install pen registers on
Hunt's phones after a detective eavesdropped on phone conversations between a consenting
informer and Hunt. State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 341-42, 450 A.2d 952, 953 (1982). The pen
registers revealed numerous calls made from Hunt's to Pirillo's phones. Id. at 342, 450 A.2d at
953. Several calls to numbers of known gamblers were also disclosed. Id.
7 State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 342, 450 A.2d 952, 953 (1982). The New Jersey Wiretapping
and Electronic Surveillance Act governs the employment of wiretaps. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:156A-1 to -26 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). The wiretaps clearly evidenced
gambling activities. 91 N.J. at 342, A.2d at 953.
8 State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 342, 450 A.2d 952, 953-54 (1982). A search of Hunt's residence
turned up gambling paraphernalia and a large amount of cash, while a search of Pirillo's home
and car turned up no evidence. See id.
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gambling charges. 9 The defendants moved to suppress the evidence
seized in the searches, as well as the information derived from Hunt's
toll billing records.' 0 The motions to suppress this evidence were
denied, and the defendants pled guilty to and were convicted of
bookmaking and conspiracy." The defendants appealed their convictions, alleging error in the denial of their suppression motions. 2 The
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, summarily affirmed
the convictions. 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification in order to review the constitutionality of the seizure of the toll
billing records. 14
The New Jersey Supreme Court held in State v. Hunt 5 that the
warrantless search and seizure of Hunt's toll billing records violated
article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, even though the
United States Supreme Court had impliedly excluded such records
from fourth amendment search and seizure protection. 6
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the unreasonable search and seizure of "persons, houses, papers,
or effects."' 7 Prior to 1967, the method for establishing that a police
activity was a search and seizure involved determining whether a

I Id. at 340-42, 450 A.2d at 952-54. Hunt and Pirillo were indicted under N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:112-3 (West 1971) (bookmaking and keeping premise for gambling), id. § 2A:98-1 (conspiracy), and id. § 2A:85-14 (aiding and abetting). See 91 N.J. at 340, 450 A.2d 952.
10 State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 342, 450 A.2d 952, 954 (1982). The defendants also sought to
exclude evidence derived from the pen registers and wiretaps. Id.
IId. at 340, 450 A.2d at 952-53 (1982). The remaining charges were dropped in accordance
with a plea bargain arrangement. Id. at 340, 450 A.2d at 953.
12 Id. at 340, 450 A.2d at 953.
13 Id. at 340, 450 A.2d at 940.
14Id. at 340-41, 450 A.2d at 953.
15 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982).
10 Id. at 343-44, 348, 450 A.2d at 954-55, 957. In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979),
the United States Supreme Court held that warrantless pen register use did not violate the fourth
amendment. Id. at 745-46. For a discussion of Smith, see infra notes 36-47 and accompanying
text.
The Hunt court concluded that law enforcement interests dictated that its decision here
apply prospectively only. 91 N.J. at 348-49, 450 A.2d at 957. The fact that the decision was not
retroactive, however, had no influence on appellants' situation because the court determined
that the evidence leading to the conviction was obtained with so little aid from the tolling records
that failure to suppress them was harmless error. The convictions, therefore, were affirmed. Id.
at 349-50, 450 A.2d at 957-58; cf. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (attenuated connection may allow admissibility of "tainted" evidence). But cf. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 741, 784 (1963) (evidence derived from illegal search inadmissible unless also
derived from independent source or extremely "attenuated").
17 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants

1983]

NOTES

805

physical intrusion into a "constitutionally protected area" had occurred.' 8 Property interests dictated the resolution of what these areas
were. 9 In 1967, the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United
States20 rejected the property-oriented search and seizure analysis,
adopting instead an approach that examined the privacy interest in2
volved and the reasonableness of the asserted expectation of privacy. '
The contested police activity in Katz was the warrantless recording of phone calls placed from public telephone booths. 22 Evidence
derived from these recordings led to Katz's conviction on federal
gambling charges. 2 3 The court of appeals, in affirming the conviction,
rejected allegations of a fourth amendment violation in the use of
evidence obtained from the recordings.2 4 The appeals court based its
decision on the absence of any physical intrusion into the phone
25
booth.
In reversing, the Supreme Court discounted the "constitutionally
protected area" approach, noting that "the Fourth Amendment pro-

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. Thus, for a search and seizure to be constitutional, it must be established that it was
reasonable. See United States v.Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); United States v.Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1973). Generally, a search is considered reasonable if it is conducted pursuant to a
valid warrant. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 7; United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407
U.S. 297, 315-18 (1972); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (limited, warrantless search
of a suspect allowed when law enforcement officials believe the person is armed and dangerous).
Evidence seized during a search that is violative of the fourth amendment will be excluded from
trial. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (exclusionary rule applies to federal
courts); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1960) (exclusionary rule applies to state courts
through the fourteenth amendment). See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974).
"
See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961).
'9 See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942).
See generally Note,
From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection,
43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968, 969-75 (1968) (historical background for the importance of property
concepts in fourth amendment analysis and their relation to the idea of "constitutionally protected area").
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
" Id. at 352-53; see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-40 (1979) (discussing Katz). For a
general discussion of Katz, see Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test,
76 MICH. L. REv. 154, 154-57, 171-75 (1977), and Note, supra note 19, at 975-78.
22 389 U.S. at 348. Katz had been observed using two phone booths at certain times daily.
Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). F.B.I.
agents placed microphones on top of the two booths and recorded Katz's end of his phone
conversations. Id.
"' See Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131-33 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
24 Id. at 133.
Id. at 133-34.
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tects people-and not simply 'areas.' ",26 Writing for the majority,
Justice Stewart concluded that because public telephones play a vital
role in confidential communication, and because the normal assumption of a person using a phone booth is that his words will not be
subject to public broadcast, a privacy interest upon which petitioner
"justifiably relied" had been breached. 27 Justice Stewart therefore
held that the recording of Katz's conversations constituted a search
and seizure.

28

In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan elaborated on the decision by saying that in order for a person's "expectation of privacy" to
be covered by the fourth amendment, it must pass a two fold test. 29
The person must display an actual, subjective privacy expectation,
and additionally, that expectation must be one that society recognizes
as reasonable. 30 Justice Harlan also noted that if a person left open his
activities, statements, or objects to public exposure, there could be no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the matter exposed. 3' Since Justice Harlan concluded that the recording of Katz's phone conversations comprised a search and seizure, he apparently believed that Katz
displayed the required expectation of privacy when using the phone,
and that the expectation was one which society recognized as reasonable.32
Although Katz explicitly extended fourth amendment protection
to telephone conversations, confusion remained about whether this
protection extended beyond the communication itself. Those lower
federal courts which considered the issue unanimously excluded toll
billing records from fourth amendment coverage. 33 Other cases, however, indicated conflict over the amendment's applicability to the
similar subject of pen registers. 34 This confusion was relieved by the

26 389 U.S. at 353.
27 See id. at 352-53.
28 Id. at 353. The Court concluded that the recording of Katz's conversations should have

been conducted only with judicial authorization, and that therefore the activity was in violation
of the fourth amendment. See id. at 359.
11 See id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See id.at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33 See Reporters Comm. v. AT&T, 593 F.2d 1030, 1043-44 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 949 (1979); United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 167 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 940 (1974). But cf. People v. MeKunes, 51 Cal. App. 3d 487, 490-91, 124 Cal. Rptr. 126,
127-28 (1975) (seizure of telephone billing records violated defendant's right to privacy).
" See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 738 (1979). Pen registers are similar to tolling
records in that both record only that the call took place, not the content of the call. Hunt, 91 N.J.
at 343-44, 450 A.2d at 954; cf. People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 654, 602 P.2d 738, 747, 159 Cal.
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United States Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Maryland,35 which
explicitly excluded the use of pen registers from fourth amendment
36
coverage.
Smith concerned a pen register which was installed on petitioner's phone at the request of the police. 37 The trial court denied Smith's
fourth amendment-based motion to suppress evidence derived from
the pen register, and he was convicted of robbery. 38 The Maryland
Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Smith had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in numbers dialed on his telephone.39 The
Supreme Court of the United States, applying Justice Harlan's two40
fold analysis from Katz, affirmed the conviction.
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun remarked that for
several reasons, the public probably did not entertain a subjective
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers they dialed. 41 He
noted that telephone users knew that the numbers they dial were
conveyed to the phone company. 42 Additionally, the court commented that subscribers were aware of the capability of the phone
company to make records of numbers dialed, since subscribers received monthly records of long distance charges, 43 and were told in
telephone directories of the phone company's capacity, through use of
pen registers, to identify the origin of obscene telephone calls. 44 Justice

Rptr. 818, 827 (1979) (no constitutional distinction between tolling records and pen registers).
But cf. Fishman, Pen Registers and Privacy: Risks, Expectations, and the Nullification of
Congressional Intent, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 557, 570-71 (1980) (warrantless seizure of tolling
records invades a lesser privacy interest than unauthorized use of pen registers).
5 442 U.S. 735 (1979)
16 Id. at 745-46. This holding has been extensively criticized. See Comment, Pen Registers
After Smith v. Maryland, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 753, 765-67 (1980); Note, Installation
and Use of a Pen Register Does Not Constitute a Fourth Amendment "Search"-- Smith v.
Maryland, 38 MD. L. REV. 767, 777-81 (1979).
37 442 U.S. at 737.
38 Id. at 737-38.
" Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 173-74, 389 A.2d 858, 867-68 (1978), aff'd, 442 U.S. 739
(1979). The appellate court did not agree that Smith harbored any subjective expectation of
privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, but decided that regardless of Smith's subjective
thoughts, society would not recognize the expectation as reasonable. See id. at 174, 389 A.2d at
868.
40 442 U.S. at 745-46.
41 Id. at 743. But cf. id. at 749 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (public has subjective expectation of
privacy in local phone numbers dialed).
42 Id. at 742.
41 Id. The court refused to distinguish between local calls, for which no records are produced, and long distance calls, for which billing records are prepared. See id. at 745.
4
Id. at 742-43. Justice Blackmun observed that pen registers are also used by the phone
company for other business purposes, although he admitted that the general public probably was
not aware of this fact. Id.
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Blackmun concluded that under these circumstances, subscribers
could not have a subjective expectation that records of numbers dialed
45
would remain confidential.
The Smith Court then decided that even if Smith had possessed a
subjective expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers he dialed,
that expectation was not one that society was prepared to recognize as
reasonable. 46 Employing an assumption of the risk analysis, the Court
determined that petitioner, by voluntarily exposing the phone numbers to the phone company, took the chance that the numbers would
be given to law enforcement officials. 47 Therefore, the Court concluded that since Smith had no "legitimate" expectation of privacy in
the numbers he dialed, the unauthorized use of a pen register did not
violate the fourth amendment.48
Twice before Hunt, 49 the New Jersey Supreme Court used the
state constitution to extend greater protection from unlawful search
and seizure to the general public than is afforded by the fourth
amendment to the Federal Constitution. 5° The first case, State v.
Johnson,5 involved a warrantless search of an apartment.5 2 At trial,
defendant made a fourth amendment-based motion to suppress evidence seized during the search on the ground that consent to the
search had not been given. 53 The trial court granted the motion
4- Id. at 743.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 744. The inability of modern telephone switching equipment to "remember" local
numbers dialed in the normal course of business-as opposed to human operators capable,
theoretically, of unlimited memory-did not, in the Court's view, increase Smith's expectation of
privacy. Id. at 744-45.
Justice Marshall found that the "assumption of the risk" analysis was inappropriate, since an
individual has no other realistic option but to relay digital information to the phone company in
the course of placing a call. See id. at 749-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 745-46. Although Smith involved pen registers, some
state courts have held that the
decision excludes telephone billing records from fourth amendment coverage as well. See Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 3
Ind.3 , 409 N.E. 2d 1089, 1090 (1980); People v. Blair, 25 Cal.
3d 640, 654, 602 P.2d 738, 747, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818, 827 (1979).
19 See State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346
A.2d 66 (1975).
5o State courts can protect individual rights under state constitutions to a greater degree than
the rights are protected at the federal level. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74, 81 (1980); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). See generally Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977); Comment,
The Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982).
51 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975).
52 See id. at 351, 346 A.2d at 66-67. Narcotics allegedly belonging to defendant Johnson were
found in his fiancee's apartment. See id. at 357, 346 A.2d at 70 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
11 See id. at 351-52, 346 A.2d at 66-67. The issue was whether Johnson's fiancee had
consented to the search of her apartment. See id. at 357-58, 346 A.2d at 70 (Pashman, J.,
dissenting).
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because the state was unable to prove that consent had been "knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and unequivocally given." 54 The appellate division reversed, concluding that the trial court had used an
improper standard in determining the validity of the asserted consent. 55 Relying on the United States Supreme Court decision Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 56 the appellate court determined that while the
fourth amendment required consent in a noncustodial situation to be
voluntary,57 it does not require that the searched party have knowledge of his right to refuse to consent to a search. 58 The New Jersey
Supreme Court, relying on the state constitution, modified the appellate decision, holding that such knowledge was a necessary require59
ment.
Initially, Justice Sullivan noted that a state may interpret its own
constitution to impose more stringent search and seizure standards
than are required under federal law. 60 After acknowledging the Schneckloth federal requirements, the court reasoned that article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution also required that the prosecution prove that consent was voluntarily given. 6' Justice Sullivan
concluded, however, that "even in a noncustodial situation," knowledge of the right to refuse consent was a necessary element of a
"voluntary" search, 62 therefore imposing a higher standard under
63
state law than under federal law.

51 Id. at 351-52, 346 A.2d at 67.

Id. at 351-53, 346 A.2d at 67.
5 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
17 See 68 N.J. at 352-53, 346 A.2d at 67. The Court held in Schneckloth
that
when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a
search on the basis of consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that
it demonstrate that the consent was voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or
coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined
from all the circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a
factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such
knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.
412 U.S. at 248-49.
58 68 N.J. at 352-53, 346 A.2d at 67.
59Id. at 353-54, 346 A.2d at 68. The motion to suppress was remanded to the trial judge for
a ruling consistent with the state supreme court's decision. Id. at 354, 346 A.2d at 68.
60 Id. at 353, 346 A.2d at 67. This obtains irrespective of the virtually identical language
contained in the fourth amendment and in article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution.
Id. at 353 n.2, 346 A.2d at 68 n.2.
11 Id. at 352-53, 346 A.2d at 68.
62 Id. at 353-54, 346 A.2d at 68.
"I Under the federal standards, the consenting party's knowledge of his right to refuse to
consent to a search is not a required element of consent. See supra note 57. Justice Pashman,
55
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State v. Alston,6 4 the second case, concerned evidence obtained
during a warrantless search of an automobile. 65 The state supreme
court noted that recent federal Supreme Court decisions had abolished
the standing of automobile passengers to make fourth amendment
challenges to the admissibility of evidence seized during automobile
searches, even where the passenger owned the property. 66 The New
Jersey court, however, elected to protect the standing rights of car
67
passengers by invoking the state constitution.
Justice Clifford began by noting that federal case law governing a
defendant's standing to challenge the validity of a search, based upon
legitimate expectations of privacy,6 8 resulted in "inadequate protection against unreasonable searches and seizures." '6' He found that the
federal standard was too vague since it led to inconsistent results that
could conflict with a person's property interests.70 Justice Clifford
decided that the state constitution protected the right of defendants to
challenge warrantless searches and seizures beyond federal guarantees
in two ways: 1) It required that proprietary or possessory interests

dissenting in Johnson, argued that the court should have imposed an even higher standard that
would require police to warn individuals of their right to refuse consent before a search could be
conducted. See 68 N.J. at 367-68, 346 A.2d at 76 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
64 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981).
65 88 N.J. at 216-17, 440 A.2d at 1313-14. After stopping the car for speeding, police
discovered shotgun shells in the car's open glove compartment and a covered shotgun protruding
from underneath the seat. Id. at 216, 440 A.2d at 1313-14. At that point, the defendants were
placed under arrest and a further search of the passenger compartment produced two handguns.
Id. at 217, 440 A.2d at 1314. The driver and his three passengers were charged with weapons
violations but the trial court granted a motion to suppress the weapons from evidence. Id. The
appellate court reversed with respect to the handguns on the ground that once the defendants
had been taken into custody, no "exigent circumstances" existed which could justify any supplemental search of the car without a warrant. Id. at 218, 440 A.2d at 1314. The appeal to the
supreme court involved only the seizure of the handguns. Id. at 218-19, 440 A.2d at 1314.
68 Id. at 224, 440 A.2d at 1317-18. The state court based this conclusion on the United States
Supreme Court decisions in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 128-29, 148-49 (1978) (passengers
lacked standing to challenge unauthorized search of automobile when evidence seized aided in
their conviction and passengers had asserted neither ownership nor possession of the evidence),
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 84-85 (1980) (no automatic standing for respondent
charged with possession of stolen mail to challenge warrantless search), and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980) (disallowing standing even when ownership asserted). 88 N.J.
at 224, 440 A.2d at 1317.
67 88 N.J. at 226, 440 A.2d at 1318-19.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980).
66 88 N.J. at 226, 440 A.2d at 1318-19.
70 Id. at 226-27, 440 A.2d at 1319. Justice Clifford agreed with Justice Marshall's dissent in
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980),which argued that fourth amendment protection
extended to a person's "effects" as well as to his house or body. 88 N.J. at 227, 440 A.2d at 1319
(citing 448 U.S. at 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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determine standing 7 and 2) it guaranteed "automatic standing" 72 to
defendants who challenged the validity of a search and seizure of
evidence used to prove any possessory offense.7 3
In State v. Hunt, the New Jersey Supreme Court again extended
protection against warrantless searches beyond that found in the
fourth amendment by relying on the state constitution. The Hunt
court initially observed that Smith excluded toll billing records from
fourth amendment protection. 74 Justice Schreiber remarked, however, that the inquiry did not end there, as the seizure of those records
also must be examined with reference to the state charter. 75 He acknowledged that, from the public's perspective, uniform rules controlling search and seizure were desirable unless strong policy reasons
"justify a departure." 7 6 Noting New Jersey's historical commitment to
safeguarding the privacy of telephone conversations, 77 the court decided that more protection should be given for telephone billing records than federal law furnished and held that the warrantless seizure
of the records violated article I, paragraph 7 of the state constitu78
tion.
The court stated that, in general, telephone conversations "by
people in their homes or offices" are shielded from government intrusion.7 9 It acknowledged, however, that if either party made the conversation available to others, the parties' privacy interest was altered.8 0 Justice Schreiber focused on the question whether absent such
disclosure, the phone company's role in transmitting a call destroyed
the privacy interests of the parties involved, thereby allowing the
government access to both the conversation and the record of the call's

88 N.J. at 228, 440 A.3d at 1319.
Automatic standing is the right of defendants charged with possessory offenses to "challenge the legality of the search which produced evidence against them, without regard to
whether they had an expectation of privacy in the premises searched." United States v. Salvucci,
448 U.S. 83, 84-85 (1980).
73 88 N.J. at 228-29, 440 A.2d at 1320. After ruling on the standing issue, the court held that
the search was justified. 88 N.J. at 235, 440 A.2d at 1323.
71 91 N.J. at 344, 450 A.2d at 954-55.
75 Id. at 344, 450 A.2d at 955.
71 See id. at 344-45, 450 A.2d at 955.
"7 See id. at 345, 450 A.2d at 955. The court mentioned the state legislature's statutory bans
on wiretapping, N.J. STAT ANN. §§ 2A:156A-1 to -26 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). as
well as the state judiciary's narrow interpretation of wiretap laws, e.g., In re Wire Communication, 76 N.J. 255, 386 A.2d 1295 (1978). 91 N.J. at 345, 450 A.2d at 955.
" See 91 N.J. at 342-46, 450 A.2d at 954-55.
71 Id. at 346, 450 A.2d at 956.
7

72

80 Id.
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destination. 8 ' The court concluded that in such a situation, the caller
would be entitled to assume a privacy interest in the numbers he dials,
just as he may assume, under the Katz rationale,2 that his telephone
8
conversations will not be publicly disseminated.
Justice Schreiber stated that, from a customer's viewpoint, all
information conveyed during telephone use was private, including the
digits dialed. 8 3 Since it is a matter of necessity for the phone company's instruments to transmit the calls and to make records for accounting purposes, Justice Schreiber thought it unrealistic to assume a
person's privacy interests dissipate simply because the phone company
was aware of the calls.8 4 He reasoned that because the disclosure was
for a defined business purpose and not intended to be known to third
parties, billing records like the conversations themselves deserved protection.8 5 The court therefore held that the state police wrongfully

86
seized Hunt's records.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Handler enunciated his views
concerning state courts' application of state constitutions "as a fountainhead of individual rights."18 7 He recognized that some state independence was a symbol of healthy federalism, 8 8 but worried that
states would abuse the practice." Justice Handler said that federal

8! See id. The court stated that the issue was whether the "company's participation destroy[ed] the sanctity of the call, which comprise[d] data as to both who was contacted and what
message was conveyed, so as to permit unauthorized governmental intrusion." Id.
82 See id. at 346-47, 450 A.2d at 956.
83 Id. at 347, 450 A.2d at 956. The court apparently felt that a person harbors a subjective
expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed. See id. Contra Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
'4 See 91 N.J. at 347, 450 A.2d at 956.
85 See id. The court was also concerned that allowing the unlawful seizure of telephone
billing records could lead to a loss of political liberty. Id.
8 Id. at 345-48, 450 A.2d at 955-57. The court noted that two states have followed the
federal standard enunciated in Smith. Id. at 348, 450 A.2d at 956. One of the decisions cited,
however, State v. Fredette, 411 A.2d 65 (Me. 1979), concerned bank records, not telephone
billing records, and followed the United States Supreme Court decision of United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976), not Smith. See 411 A.2d at 67.
87

Id.

Id. at 362, 450 A.2d at 964 (Handler, J., concurring). He did recognize, however, that
state and federal cooperation leading to an orderly legal system was also a sign of healthy
federalism. See id. at 363, 450 A.2d at 964 (Handler, J., concurring).
89 Id. at 361, 450 A.2d at 963-64 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler noted the public
backlash in California against a perceived overuse of the state constitution by the California
Supreme Court. Id. at 361 n.1, 450 A.2d at 964 n.1 (Handler, J., concurring). As a result of the
backlash, a referendum was passed requiring California courts to give provisions of the state
constitution the same meaning as parallel provisions of the Federal Constitution. See id.
88
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precedents should be given substantial consideration, and went on to
articulate criteria for determining when the court should resort to the
New Jersey Constitution as an independent source of protection for
individual rights. 90 Relying on one of these criteria, that of state
tradition, he explained that New Jersey's established legislative and
judicial policy protecting phone conversations was proper justification
for broadening state constitutional protection to include telephone
billing records."
Justice Pashman also wrote a concurring opinion in which he
agreed with the majority's result,9 2 but he believed that the other
opinions failed to stress adequately the potential dangers to political
liberty should tolling records be subject to warrantless police seizure. 93
Further, he was concerned by the efforts of the majority and Justice
Handler to place limits on the circumstances in which state courts
should independently construe their own constitution to afford greater
protection for the general public. 4 Justice Pashman pointed out that
previous Supreme Court decisions had merely acknowledged the existence of the court's power to follow a different path under state law
without setting forth any rules as to when that power should be
used. 95 He was of the impression that, subject to Hunt, the majority
would follow federal law in the absence of strong policy reasons for
departing from it, 96 and that Justice Handler would follow the federal
rule unless one of his articulated criteria were met. 97 To the contrary,

1oId. at 363-67, 450 A.2d at 965-67 (Handler, J.,concurring). The seven criteria discussed
were the following: textual language, legislative history of the state constitutional provision,
preexisting state law suggesting separate state constitutional protection, structural differences
between the state and Federal constitutions, the extent that the matter is of local or of state
interest, state tradition, and public attitudes. Id. at 364-67, 450 A.2d at 965-67 (Handler, J.,
concurring). Similar criteria have previously been set forth. E.g., State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d
170, 200-02, 622 P.2d 1199, 1217 (1980) (Horowitz, J., dissenting); Howard, State Courts and
Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 935-42 (1976).
11 See 91 N.J. at 372, 450 A.2d at 969 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler reasoned
that while revelation of telephone numbers dialed does not disclose the transpired conversation,
telephone numbers dialed and the resulting conversations are "inextricably related." Id. at 37172, 450 A.2d at 969 (Handler, J., concurring) (quoting In re Wire Communication, 76 N.J. 255,
271, 386 A.2d 1295, 1303 (1978) (Handler, J., dissenting)).
0' Id. at 350, 450 A.2d at 958 (Pashman, J., concurring).
Q Id. at 350-52, 450 A.2d at 958-59 (Pashman, J., concurring). The majority had briefly
considered this threat. See id. at 347, 405 A.2d at 956.
11 Id. at 350, 450 A.2d at 958 (Pashman, J., concurring).
15 Id. at 354, 450 A.2d at 960 (Pashman, J., concurring); see Alston, 88 N.J. at 255-26, 440
A.2d at 1318-19; Johnson, 68 N.J. at 353, 346 A.2d at 67-68.
"1 91 N.J. at 354-55, 450 A.2d at 960 (Pashman, J., concurring).
17 Id. at 354, 450 A.2d at 960 (Pashman, J., concurring).
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Justice Pashman stated that the state should construe independently
its constitution absent a specific reason to conform to the Federal
Constitution.9 8 He presented several reasons for this view. 99
First, Justice Pashman found that the state court has an obligation under the New Jersey Constitution to protect individual liberties
when it concludes that these rights are not properly protected under
federal law. 00 Second, he claimed that a diversity of analysis is good
for federalism since states act as "laborator[ies]" for new ideas.' 0'
Third, he noted that state courts do not share the limitations of
federalism burdening the United States Supreme Court, since active
federal court protection of individual liberties may interfere with
basic federalist concepts. 10 2 For these reasons, Justice Pashman concluded that the New Jersey Supreme Court should not hesitate to
protect state citizens through reliance on the state constitution even
when parallel provisions of the Federal Constitution have been inter10 3
preted in a contrary manner.
In Hunt, the New Jersey Supreme Court correctly determined
that, in the absence of federal constitutional protection, telephone
billing records deserved state constitutional shielding from warrantless
search and seizure. 0 4 As the court recognized, the public has a legitimate expectation of privacy in telephone records. 0 5 The court realized that the information is relayed for a limited, necessary business
purpose, and that people do not expect it to be given to third par-

98 Id. at 355, 450 A.2d at 960 (Pashman, J., concurring). Justice Pashman felt that consistency alone was not a strong enough reason to refrain from invoking the state charter. Id. This
view diverges from that expressed by the majority and in Justice Handler's concurrence. See id.
at 345, 450 A.2d at 955; id.at 362-63, 450 A.2d at 964 (Handler, J., concurring).
9Ild. at 355-58, 450 A.2d at 60-62 (Pashman, J., concurring).
Id. at 355, 450 A.2d at 960 (Pashman, J., concurring).
I0
101 Id. at 356, 450 A.2d at 960 (Pashman, J., concurring) (citing New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
102 91 N.J. at 357, 450 A.2d at 961 (Pashman, J., concurring). Justice Pashman noted that too
active a United States Supreme Court would infringe on decision making responsibilities normally reserved for state governments. See id. Brennan, supra note 50, at 503. He opined also that
state courts would be better acclimated to local conditions and concerns. 91 N.J. at 358, 450
A.2d at 962 (Pashman, J., concurring).
"03See 91 N.J. at 358, 450 A.2d at 962 (Pashman, J., concurring).
104This holding accords with the views of most commentators, who have been critical of the
lack of fourth amendment protection for the telephone numbers which a person dials. See
Comment, supra note 36, at 765-66; Note, supra note 36, at 780-81. But cf. Fishman, supra note
34, at 574 & n.91 (lack of fourth amendment protection for long distance telephone billing
records is justified).
1o5See 91 N.J. at 348, 450 A.2d at 951 (adopting the view from 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEizuRE § 2.7, at 67-69 (Supp. 1982)).
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ties.10 6 Phone numbers that a person dials reveal information about
the dialer,10 7 and thus the records' warrantless procurement presents a
danger to civil liberties. 08 Law enforcement officials may be inconvenienced by a requirement to obtain court authorization before seizing telephone billing records, 0 9 but this difficulty does not justify
affording police unlimited access to materials considered by the public
to be private information." 0
The Burger Court's failure to provide adequate safeguards for
individual rights has prompted state courts to interpret state constitutions in a manner which affords citizens additional protection."'
There is controversy, however, regarding the degree of importance
that state courts should give to United States Supreme Court interpretations of parallel federal constitutional provisions when they do
this." 2 The majority and concurring opinions in Hunt illustrate this
disagreement. The majority would depart from federal fourth amendment guidelines only when justified by strong policy reasons, 1 ' 3 while

106 See 91 N.J. at 347, 450 A.2d at 956.

107 The phone numbers a person dials may reveal travel patterns and associations and yield
insight into the nature of the conversation. See Comment, supra note 36, at 781; see also 91 N.J.
at 371, 450 A.2d at 769 (Handler, J., concurring) (discussing phone numbers' ability to disclose
private information). But cf. Reporters Comm. v. AT&T Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1036 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979) (tolling records reveal limited information).
108 See 91 N.J. at 347, 450 A.2d at 956; id. at 351-52, 450 A.2d at 958 (Pashman, J.,
concurring).
101 The acquisition of tolling records by police is a common investigatory practice. Reporters
Comm. v. AT&T Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979);
see 91 N.J. at 349, 450 A.2d at 957.
"I The effect of the Hunt decision on police procurement of numbers dialed from a public
phone is unclear. In his opinion, Justice Schreiber emphasized the fact that the telephone calls
under consideration were placed from a person's home or office, and he made no mention of
numbers dialed from public phones. See 91 N.J. at 347, 450 A.2d at 955-56. Since the court
equated a person's privacy interest in telephone conversations with that in the numbers dialed,
see id. at 346-47, 450 A.2d at 955-56, it should have indicated clearly that numbers dialed from
all phones would be afforded protection.
"I See Brennan, supra note 50, at 495-97; Comment, supra note 50, at 1368-69.
112 Compare Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-JudicialReview Under the
California Constitution, 6 HASTINCS CONST. L.Q. 975, 989-96 (1979) (absent the presence of
suggested "neutral criteria," state courts should follow federal constitutional guidelines when
interpreting provisions of state constitutions) with Collins, Reliance on State ConstitutionsAway From a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q., 1, 16-18 (1981) (state courts
should downplay the importance of federal constitutional decisions when conducting state
constitutional analysis).
"I See 91 N.J. at 345, 450 A.2d at 955. Although the concurring opinions discussed in a
general fashion the importance federal constitutional decisions should be given when a state
court analyzes the state constitution, see id. at 350, 450 A.2d at 958 (Pashman, J., concurring),
id. at 363, 450 A.2d at 964 (Handler, J., concurring), the majority confined its discussion of the
issue to the search and seizure area. See id. at 344-45, 450 A.2d at 955.
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Justice Handler would follow them unless certain criteria are met." 4
In contrast, Justice Pashman would give little weight to federal stan5
dards in the absence of strong policy reasons for adopting them."
The interpretational limitations imposed by the majority and
Justice Handler are new. In both AIston and Johnson, the court
merely acknowledged its power to interpret the search and seizure
section of the New Jersey Constitution differently than the federal
fourth amendment without indicating under what circumstances it
would embrace or reject the federal rules."" In Hunt, however, both
the majority and Justice Handler display a predisposition to adhere to
federal fourth amendment standards, indicating that departure
should occur only when properly justified." 7 This restriction on the
court's power to interpret independently the state search and seizure
provision "8 could result in an obstacle to protecting the public from
some types of unjust police intrusions. Such a case may arise if the
court is faced with the issue of the constitutionality of a warrantless
seizure of bank records."'
In United States v. Miller, 20 the United States Supreme Court
held that the warrantless seizure of banking records did not violate the
fourth amendment;' 2' thus far, the New Jersey Supreme Court has not
considered the constitutionality of such a seizure with reference to the

114 See id. at 363, 450 A.2d at 964 (Handler, J., concurring).
"15See id. at 355, 450 A.2d at 960 (Pashman, J., concurring).
116See Alston, 88 N.J. at 225, 440 A.2d at 1318; Johnson, 68 N.J. at 353, 346 A.2d at 67.
117 While the court's decision in Hunt suggesting a new deference to United States Supreme

Court search and seizure decisions could be viewed as a retreat from judicial activism, Hunt is
more progressive in at least one aspect than either Johnson or Alston. In those cases, United
States Supreme Court decisions had invalidated fourth amendment interpretations which were
already entrenched in New Jersey. Alston, 88 N.J. at 227-28, 440 A.2d at 1319-20; see Johnson,
68 N.J. at 352, 346 A.2d at 67. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the previous standards by
abandoning the fourth amendment and using the state constitution instead to support the
decisions. See Alston, 88 N.J. at 228, 440 A.2d at 1319; Johnson, 68 N.J. at 252-54, 346 A.2d at
67-68. In Hunt, the court was not simply preserving a discredited interpretation of federal law
which theretofore had been followed by the state, but instead was extending to the general
public protection which it had never before received.
118 This restriction was unnecessary, since the state high court, as the final arbiter of the state
constitution, need not justify the fact that interpretations of state charter provisions may differ
from United States Supreme Court interpretations of parallel federal constitutional clauses. See
Collins, supra note 112.
I" Bank records include photocopies of "checks, drafts, or similar instruments." See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1829b(d) (1976).
120 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
2I Id. at 437. The Miller court reached its decision after noting that a "depositor takes the
risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to
the Government." Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971)); cf.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 (applying assumption of the risk approach to telephone numbers).
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state constitution. 122 As with toll billing records, people have a strong
privacy interest in their banking records. The information is conveyed
to the bank for a limited business purpose, and people do not expect it
to be revealed to third parties. 123 Given this similarity between telephone and banking records, and the wide latitude Justice Pashman
would allow in the interpretation of the state constitution, 24 a court
adopting his approach would find that the warrantless seizure of a
person's banking records violates the search and seizure provision of
the New Jersey Constitution. 25 An opposite result might be reached,
however, by applying Justice Handler's approach.
Justice Handler grounded his concurrence in Hunt in New Jer26
sey's long-standing policy of protecting telephone communications.
Since there is no parallel historic policy toward the privacy of banking
transactions, and because none of his other criteria apparently is
met, 27 a court applying Justice Handler's rationale would probably
hold that banking records are not entitled to state constitutional protection from warrantless search and seizure.

22 Some state courts have held that the warrantless seizure of bank records is unlawful under
their state constitutions. E.g., Charnes v. DiCiacomo, 200 Colo. 194, 201, 612 P.2d 1117, 112021 (1980); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 44-47, 403 A.2d 1283, 1288-89 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 704 (1980). Contra State v. Fredette, 411 A.2d 65, 67 (Me. 1979); Fitzgerald v.
State, 599 P.2d 572, 577 (Wyo. 1979).
123 Burrons v. Superior Court of San Bernadino County, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 243, 529 P.2d 590,
593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169 (1974). But cf. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (even if party assumes bank
records will be used only for limited business purpose, the fourth amendment does not afford
protection against warrantless seizure).
124 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
125 One problem with Justice Pashman's approach of minimizing the importance of federal
law is that there are very few cases dealing with the search and seizure provision of the New
Jersey Constitution and, therefore, little guidance for conducting a state constitutional search
and seizure analysis. New Jersey courts would inevitably be influenced to some degree by the
federal decisions. See Kelman, Forward:Rediscovering the State ConstitutionalBill of Rights, 27
WAYNE L. REV. 413, 431 (1981) (discussing why state constitutional issues are often phrased in
terms derived from federal constitutional analysis). Should the United States Supreme Court,
however, continue its trend toward restricting fourth amendment rights, and the New Jersey
Supreme Court continue to fill the void by resorting to the state constitution, a larger volume of
case law interpreting the state's search and seizure provision will develop, and the less protective
federal decisions will necessarily become less important.
12 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
127 See 91 N.J. at 364-67, 451 A.2d at 965-67 (Handler, J., concurring). One of Justice

Handler's stated criteria, "[d]istinctive attitudes of a state's citizenry," has never been applied by
the New Jersey Supreme Court to justify departure from federal fourth amendment parameters,
and he gave no indication as to how "public attitudes" is measured. See id. at 367, 450 A.2d at
966-67 (Handler, J., concurring). He did cite two decisions by non-New Jersey courts, however,
that in his opinion utilized public attitudes to justify greater protection for individual rights
under their state constitutions than was afforded federally, id. (Handler, J., concurring) (citing
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While the Hunt majority recognized that the privacy interest
present in bank and toll billing records is virtually the same, 128 it is not
clear whether it would hold that the warrantless seizure of the former
is unlawful under the state constitution. The majority stated that it
would not depart from federal search and seizure standards absent
"strong policy reasons," and it appeared to find such reasons for
protecting toll billing records in the state's traditional protection of
telephone communications. 129 Since, as previously noted, there exists
no similar state policy relating to banking records, a court holding
consistently with the Hunt majority would have to find a different
justification for departing from federal standards. Although the court
could find that identical privacy interests should be treated identically, it is still an open question.
Since the general public's privacy interest in banking records is
equally strong as that in telephone records, the former unquestionably
merit protection from warrantless seizure. Although the Hunt court's
decision to protect toll billing records extends to the public a deserved
constitutional protection, the language of the majority's and Justice
Handler's opinions which limits when such protection will be afforded
unnecessarily hinders the court's ability to interpret the search and
seizure provision of the state constitution. Both should have followed
Justice Pashman's advice and avoided placing restrictions on the
court's rightful power.
Robert C. Nabinger

District Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E. 2d 1274, 1282 (1980), and Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494,
503-04 (Alaska 1975)), but neither opinion discussed how a "public attitude" should be determined. See Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1282, and Ravin, 537 P.2d at 503-04. Because of the
vagueness of the application of this criterion, it is difficult to predict when, if ever, it will be
invoked.
"2' See 91 N.J. at 348, 451 A.2d at 957. The court noted with approval the reasoning of other
state courts which found that the public has a legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records.
Id.
19 See id. at 344-45, 451 A.2d at 955.

